October 30, 2014 at 11:42 am | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
ITF EU representative Dr Hassan Aydinli and Mrs Hassan Aydinli were invited by H.E. The Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey Mr Hakan Olcay and Mrs Mehveş Olcay at a reception on the Occasion of the 91st Anniversary of the Proclamation of the Republic of Turkey.
The reception was held at the prestigious Cercle Royal Gaulois in Brussels.
With Ms. Döndu Sarıışık, representative of TRT Radio Télévision Turque
Dr Hassan Aydinli with H.E. the Ambassador of Ukraine to the EU
Dr Hassan Aydinli spoke at length of the situation of the Turkmens in Iraq with Mr Thomas Mergenthaler, Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the EU and with Mr. Jean-Paul Mues, Advisor at the Belgian Ministry of Justice.
He also talked with Minister Emir Kir and several other Turkish VIPs.
October 30, 2014 at 11:32 am | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
Tags: Azerbaijan ethnic minorities
Prof. Dr. Etibar A. Najafov, Head Adviser, Service of the State Counsellor of the Republic of Azerbaijan for Multiculturalism, Interethnic and Religious Affaires - Dr. Hassan Aydinli, ITF EU Representative - Mr. Ayhan Demirci, Azerbaijan-Belgium Friendship Association.
Mr. Hüseyin Dönmez, Kanal Avrupa Media GmbH – Dr. Hassan Aydinli, ITF EU representative – Mr. Ayhan Demirci, Azerbaijan-Belgium Friendship Association.
The conference was hosted by MEP György Schöpflin
The conference was organized by Mr. Willy Fautré, Director of Human Rights Without Frontiers who presented the fact-finding mission report about 15 ethnic groups in Azerbaijan.
Dr. Mark Barwick of HRWF made a welcoming speech and introduced the representatives of the Russian and Greek ethnic groups: Russia representative Ms Yelena Voronina and Greek representative Ms Saida Mehdiyeva.
Mr. Willy Fautré, Director of Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) based in Brussels presented the report he has recently published: AZERBAIJAN – Ethnic Diversity – Peaceful Co-existence and State Management.
The study addresses the issue of the co-existence of ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan and the management of diversity by the state. It highlights the specificities of a number of minorities and their historical roots, as well as the concerns of the state, which is still in the process of creating a new identity from the ashes of the former Soviet Union and which, due to recent experience, is also concerned about its territorial integrity.
The challenges were and are still huge: the identification of ethnic minorities in the light of the self-identification of their members, the accommodation of collective rights, social integration while respecting diversity and security.
In the absence of a clear definition of basic terms such as “national minority” or “ethnic minority”, the number of ethnic and foreign groups that are present in any given country is virtually impossible to define. Concerning Azerbaijan, the figures vary from 60 to 80, depending on the sources and the actors met byHuman Rights Without Frontiers on the occasion of several trips to Azerbaijan.
To be a member of a minority is never easy and to accommodate the claims of minorities is often a difficult exercise for any state.
On the one hand, minorities would like their identity, their culture, their folklore, their language or their religion to be preserved and developed. However, some of these markers risk getting diluted by mixed marriages and school education in the official language. They can disappear from one generation to the next. Members of minorities want to be fully integrated in society, but they do not want to be entirely assimilated.
On the other hand, states often perceive demands for more collective rights, for more autonomy, for constitutional and political changes with suspicion and as a possible threat to their territorial integrity in the future.
Both of these trends are perceptible in Azerbaijan.
Mr. Willy Fautré said that there may be lessons to learn from Azerbaijan’s experience of ethnic and ethno-religious diversity that could be helpful for other states that are dealing with comparable diversity within their borders.
In his report on Azerbaijan, Mr. Willy Fautré included the following National and Ethnic Minorities:
October 29, 2014 at 8:44 am | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
Tags: West bombing Iraq
The history of bombing the Middle East nation is as old as the history of bombing.
October 20, 2014 |
President Obama’s campaign of aerial bombardment against ISIS in Iraq and Syria maintains a British colonial policy designed 100 years ago to avoid the consequences of putting large numbers of boots on the ground in what are now Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
As a British official in Iraq reported in April 1919, “No sooner has one area been subdued than another breaks out in revolt and has to be dealt with by aeroplane…all these tribal disturbances have been dealt with from the air… thus the Army has been saved from marching many weary miles over bad country and sustaining casualties.”
That Western air forces are still bombing the same countries based on the same rationale a century later is a staggering failure of politics, humanity and the rule of law.
The history of bombing Iraq is as old as the history of bombing itself. The first planes of the U.K.’s Royal Flying Corps arrived in Mesopotamia (Iraq) in 1916, as British forces fought the Turks in World War I. Originally used for reconnaissance, they were soon adapted to bombing, as on other fronts.
Despite its position on the frontier of the Ottoman and Persian Empires, Iraq was a peaceful place through most of the 18th and 19th centuries by comparison to the blood-soaked history of Europe and North America. But the bloody climax of Western militarism in the First World War soon engulfed it. After a humiliating defeat and surrender at Kut in 1915, British forces took Baghdad in 1917, and were granted a League of Nations mandate to govern Iraq, Jordan and Palestine in 1919.
Bombing soon became an integral feature of British rule. Secretary of War Winston Churchill drew up a plan to base squadrons of biplanes in well defended bases, from where they could attack rebellious tribes in the surrounding areas. ighty-three years later, Donald Rumsfeld would imitate Churchill’s plan, coining the term lily-pads for the U.S.’s Forward Operating Bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Air Marshall Hugh Trenchard sold British leaders on this new “no boots on the ground” technique of colonial policing, writing, “if the Arabs have nothing to fight against on the ground and no loot or rifles to be obtained, and nobody to kill, but have to deal with airplanes that are out of their reach… there will be no risk of disasters or heavy casualties such as are always suffered by small infantry patrols in uncivilized countries.”
Trenchard’s “no boots on the ground” strategy was irresistible to British leaders for the same reasons that President Obama has embraced a doctrine of covert war based on bombing, drones, special forces and proxy wars. As the Washington Post noted in 2010:
“For a Democratic president such as Obama, who is criticized from either side of the political spectrum for too much or too little aggression, the unacknowledged CIA drone attacks in Pakistan, along with unilateral U.S. raids in Somalia and joint operations in Yemen, provide politically useful tools.”
As the RAF assumed its role as the fiery arbiter of politics in Iraq, British officials soon began asking the tricky questions that have bedeviled Western policy ever since. Colonial officers complained that, although bombing was politically useful to officials in London, it was an ineffective substitute for addressing local grievances and resolving political problems in Iraq, leaving victims enraged and underlying problems unresolved. There was a popular “Quit Mesopotamia” movement in the U.K. and Labour MP George Lansbury spoke out against “this Hunnish and barbarous method of warfare against unarmed people.” But the U.K.’s first Labour government elected in 1924 applied the same political calculus as Obama, and the bombing continued.
The British originally planned to administer Iraq on the Indian model, with British political officers assigned to tribal leaders around the country, but the Iraqi rebellion in 1920-1 led them to revise their plans. Former Ottoman military officers had brought military expertise to a revolt launched by Shias and Persian mullahs that soon spread throughout Iraq. Like their American successors, the British adopted a “divide and rule” strategy to split Iraqi resistance. But, in contrast with the Americans, they co-opted the Sunnis instead of the Shiites and Kurds. They brought in Faisal, originally tapped to rule Syria, as King of Iraq, surrounded him with a ruling class of Sunni Arab ex-Ottoman officers, and deported the Persian mullahs to deprive the Shias of leadership.
The Ottomans had struggled to impose taxes on Iraq’s fiercely independent tribal society, but the British were determined to succeed where the Turks had failed. British fire-bombing quickly became a form of collective punishment for non-payment of taxes, even against tribes that showed no other signs of rebellion. Four squadrons of RAF bombers were stationed in Iraq, and tribes who failed to pay taxes were ruthlessly fire-bombed. A well-documented bombing campaign against Samawa in 1923-’24 burned at least 144 people to death.
One squadron was led by Arthur Harris, better known to history as Air Chief Marshall “Bomber” or “Butcher” Harris, and for fire-bombing on a far larger scale as the head of RAF Bomber Command in World War II. After a mission in Iraq in 1924, Harris reported, “The Arab and the Kurd now know what real bombing means, in casualties and damage. They know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured.”
Later, as a senior officer in Palestine during the 1936 revolt, Harris wrote that “one 250 lb or 500 lb bomb in each village that speaks out of turn” should take care of the Palestinian problem. Harris justified his war crimes in Iraq and Palestine by the same kind of racism that is drummed into American soldiers today, boasting that, “The only thing the Arab understands is the heavy hand.”
During WWII, all sides studied the effects of bombing more seriously in a desperate quest for a winning strategy. The German bombing of the Basque city of Guernica in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War shocked a Western public who had largely ignored Britain’s air-launched massacres in Asia and Africa. Far from breaking the morale of its people, the bombing of Guernica had the opposite effect, bringing together previously divided Republican factions and unifying popular resistance. Both the Luftwaffe and more sympathetic analysts concluded that bombing was politically counterproductive.
The people of London were likewise united in resistance to German bombing in 1940, but this did not stop British leaders making wrong assumptions about the psychological effects of bombing German cities. The 1941 Butt Report led the U.K. to give up “precision” bombing in favor of mass carpet bombing after it found that only one bomb in three was striking within five miles of its target. After the first mass air raid on Hamburg, Bomber Harris wrote:
“The aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive… should be unambiguously stated: the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers and the disruption of civilized life throughout Germany…. the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle-fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not byproducts of our attempts to hit factories.”
U.S. bombing since 1991 has been supported by a propaganda campaign based on the mythical properties of a new generation of “precision” weapons. The corporate media have collaborated with the Pentagon to fetishize U.S. weapons technology and persuade the public that American bombing is now so accurate that it can target enemy positions or “terrorists” without killing and maiming large numbers of civilians.
By 2003, as the U.S. and U.K prepared to launch a war that probably killed a million Iraqis, a deluded Christopher Hitchens claimed, “It can now be proposed as a practical matter that one is able to fight against a regime and not a people or a nation.” The cynical pretense that today’s bombing is qualitatively different or less destructive than Guernica, the Blitz in London or the devastation of German and Japanese cities in WWII is one of the core myths of modern Western propaganda.
This propaganda campaign was tested during the first Gulf War, beaming bomb-sight video of “precision” weapons destroying “targets” to TV screens around the world. My friend Anatole Turecki, who piloted Spitfires over London and Wellington bombers over Germany in WWII, was so angered by the U.S. propaganda campaign that he took the trouble to analyze the Pentagon’s bomb tonnage figures. He concluded that Iraq was being as indiscriminately carpet-bombed as Germany had been. He was proved correct when the Pentagon later revealed that only 7% of the bombs and missiles raining down on Iraq were in fact “precision” weapons. A UN reportdescribed the damage as “near apocalyptic,” and that it degraded what “had been a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society” to “a pre-industrial age nation.”
In March 2003, the Pentagon classified 68% of the 29,200 bombs and missiles it unleashed on Iraq as precision weapons, but even these weapons were far from 100% accurate. The U.S. Air Force defines accuracy for such weapons as striking within a 10-40 foot (3-13 meter) radius of a target, but they have blast radii up to hundreds of feet, based on the size and type of the weapon, building construction and other factors, so even “accurate” air strikes are deadly and dangerous to people hundreds of feet from their impact.
But Rob Hewson, the editor of the arms trade journal Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, estimated that only 75-80% of U.S. “precision” weapons in its “Shock & Awe” bombardment of Iraq performed with even those degrees of accuracy. With at least 4,000 precision weapons missing their targets and 9,000 that weren’t precision weapons in the first place, almost half of Shock & Awe was effectively conventional carpet-bombing. Western propaganda also disparaged themost thorough epidemiological surveys in Iraq, which suggest that about a million Iraqis have been killed and that U.S. bombing has been a leading cause of violent death and the single leading cause of violent death for children in Iraq.
In 1985, a tapestry reproduction of Picasso’s Guernica was hung at the entrance of the UN Security Council chamber, to remind diplomats of the horrors the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of military force was enacted to prevent. In February 2003, at the request of the United States, the tapestry of Guernica was covered with a blue curtain to spare Secretary of State Powell and Ambassador Negroponte the discomfort of trying to justify more Guernicas beneath a tapestry of Guernica. In 2009, the tapestry was removed.
This seems symbolic of the journey that U.S. foreign policy has traveled in that time. In 1986, soon after the tapestry of Guernica was hung at the Security Council, the International Court of Justice at the Hague ruled on the case of Nicaragua vs the United States of America. It found the United States guilty of aggression against Nicaragua and ordered the U.S. to pay reparations. The U.S. rejected the ICJ ruling, in violation of Article 94 of the UN Charter, and declared it would no longer recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. As law professor Anthony D’Amato wrote in the American Journal of International Law:
“…law would collapse if defendants could only be sued when they agreed to be sued, and the proper measurement of that collapse would be… the necessary restructuring of a vast system of legal transactions and relations predicated on the availability of courts as a last resort. There would be talk of a return to the law of the jungle.”
This was clearly not just the effect but the intent of the U.S.’s rejection of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. Since 1986, as the United States has committed increasingly systematic international crimes, it has ensured that its actions will be governed, not by the UN Charter, international law and the rulings of international courts, but by, and only by, the law of the jungle, as D’Amato suggested. The U.S. vetoed Nicaragua’s motion to enforce the ICJ judgement in the UN Security Council, and it stands defiantly ready to veto any resolution holding it accountable for any of its crimes.
Newly confident in the ability of the monopolistic U.S. media system to provide political cover for even the most serious international crimes, American leaders have made a deliberate choice to renounce the rule of law and embrace the law of the jungle. Americans and people everywhere are now living with the consequences of that decision.
A million victims of 95,000 U.S. air strikes and other war crimes have paid with their lives since 2001, while millions more suffer disability, disfigurement, pain, dislocation, disease, poverty and illiteracy. A hundred years of bombing has left countries in ruins and fragile societies torn apart by unprecedented fissures and violence. The diversity of ethnic and sectarian groups in the Middle East is a testament to a long history of tolerance that has been savagely ripped apart by a century of Western “regime change” and “divide and rule” strategies. At every turn, Western powers have recruited and unleashed repressive, anti-democratic forces to serve their own interests, only to justify further intervention and mass destruction when those forces escape external control and turn against the West. ISIS is only the latest case in point.
The roots of this crisis lie in illegitimate and barbaric Western policies, not in the desperate responses of victims in the regions affected. It is we Americans who hold the key to resolving the crisis. It is no defense to plead that our leaders are constrained by a corrupt “political reality” in Washington. We must insist that they meet their obligations to peace and the rule of law—that they stop bombing and start listening.
As Hannah Arendt wrote in The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1950, “We can no longer afford to take that which is good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live.”
A journalist once asked Mahatma Gandhi what he thought of Western civilization. He replied, “I think it would be a good idea.” It may be an idea whose time has come.
October 27, 2014 at 12:31 pm | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
Tags: Turkmens targeted by ISIS
Iraqi Turkmens say they are left alone against ISIL
Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC) officials attend a news conference in Kirkuk on Saturday. (Photo: Cihan)
October 26, 2014, Sunday/ 17:49:55/ TODAY’S ZAMAN / ISTANBUL
Iraqi Turkmens who have been the target of the terrorist Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for months said on Saturday in a press conference in Kirkuk that they have been abandoned, especially by the Western world, to face the atrocities of ISIL.
The press conference was held by the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC) to call for help against ISIL attacks on Turkmen areas. ITC Kirkuk represent
ative Mehmet Saman said Turkmens did not receive the same interest from the United Nations and the Western world that Yazidis and Christians received in the face of ISIL attacks. He said the Iraqi government has also abandoned them.
The ITC called for a campaign to provide immediate relief for Turkmen areas that are under ISIL control. According to Saman, Turkmens are forced to migrate under very difficult conditions.
In June, ISIL captured a predominantly Turkmen town in Iraq, Tal Afar, which alarmed the country’s Turkmen community, half of which are Shiites — the extremist group’s stated target
October 15, 2014 at 10:15 am | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
Tags: Iraqi and Syrian Turkmens
The Turkmen across Syria and Iraq are stuck between sectarian conflict and Kurdish nationalism.
Unlike the Kurds — the largest stateless ethnic group in the region — the Turkmen are not armed and are now struggling for their survival. Their continued existence is important because, as traditional moderates and natural links to Turkey, the Turkmen could be vital in building peace after the dust settles.
Who are the Turkmen?
Though the Turkmen are culturally and linguistically similar to their kin in Turkey, their tribes first settled in the region in the 9th century. Renowned for their horsemanship and soldiering, Turkmen tribes, in one way or another, were part of the military elite up until the early 1900s. They became part of the Ottoman Empire with the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the Ottoman’s legendary victory over the Safavid Empire. The Ottomans took care to settle Turkmen along the cities on route to the Hijaz — present-day Saudi Arabia — to secure the pilgrimage path.
As the Ottoman Empire disintegrated in the wake of World War I, the Turkmen found themselves as a minority in the two Arab-majority Kingdoms of Syria and Iraq. The past century then brought de-colonization, Arab nationalism and war. Yet Turkmen have managed to preserve their way of life. They speak a dialect of modern Turkish at home, but many are more comfortable with Arabic. Their practice of Islam remains close to the moderate Anatolian tradition.
Syria’s Turkmen are located in the Levantine Latakia province and the northern regions of Aleppo and Raqqa, close to the Turkish border, as well as the central city of Homs. The Syrian regime, headed by President Bashar al-Assad, has often fudged their population numbers, leading experts to think of the Turkmen as a tiny minority. The true figure of Syrian Turkmen is likely to be much higher. Turkmen leaders claim they number 3.5 million. No reliable census exists to verify these claims, but taking a number of known Turkmen-majority villages into account, these authors estimate that there are between 2-3 million Turkmen in Syria.
The Turkmen had a good start in Syria. Two of the Arab Republic’s early presidents were Turkmen, including the two-term President Hashim al-Atassi, whose family remains influential in Homs. Starting in the 1960s, however, the pan-Arab Baathist movement sidelined non-Arabs from politics. Then-President Hafez al-Assad’s rule was devastating to the Turkmen. He banned Turkish-language education, eradicated traces of Turkmen culture and redistributed the community’s land. Squeezed out of their possessions and way of life, the Turkmen identity was pushed out of the public eye.
Syria and Iraq are now one battleground involving local militants, governments and foreign jihadists. In this mix, ethnic Turkmen are the largest population that is seldom talked about.
The civil war in Syria of the past three years has rekindled Turkmen politics. At the beginning of the conflict in 2011, most Turkmen joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a moderate rebel group. As more Syrians took up arms, they formed their own brigades under the FSA umbrella. What is certain is there are currently more than ten armed Turkmen groups defending their positions against the Assad regime or IS. Despite being Sunni-majority, very few Turkmen seem to have joined IS ranks — certainly the least of all other Sunni groups. “They couldn’t find people among us because the Turkmen way of life is different from theirs,” Abdurrahman Mustafa, the president of the Syrian Turkmen Assembly said. “That made us ISIL’s [IS] number one target.”
The Iraqi Turkmen
Iraq’s roughly 2 million Turkmen are spread over a strip of land between the Kurds and Arabs, ranging from Mosul to Diyala province. Their recent history has not been easier than their kin in Syria. Starting in the late 1950s, the Iraqi regime massacred Turkmen elites, closed their schools, renamed their villages and, in many instances, forced them to change their names under a policy of Arabization. This was done by the communist regime, as well as the Baathists and Saddam Hussein later on. Despite the merciless campaign, however, they held onto more of their wealth and social standing than Syria’s Turkmen. Nouri al-Said, a former Iraqi prime minister and the son of a Turkish Pasha, and many of his colleagues who served before the coup in 1958 were Turkmen. More recent notables include journalists Nermin el-Mufti and Abbas Ahmet, or the poetess Munevver Molla Hassun.
In 1995, Iraq’s Turkmen founded the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) with Turkey’s assistance. The ITF served as an umbrella group for regional Turkmen political leaders, which allowed them to organize in the wake of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. That stands in contrast to Syrian Turkmen, who only formed political organizations at the onset of the civil war. By the time Iraq formed its first government in 2005, the Turkmen had a civil body of elected leaders, representatives in the Iraqi parliament and offices in foreign capitals, including Ankara, Washington DC and London. But the organization lacked one critical element to wield power in Iraq: weapons. To this day, its lightly armed militia can barely protect its leaders from assassination attempts.
This inability to take and hold territory has come at a high price to the Turkmen community during the IS surge this summer. The Turkmen suffered terrible blows in Tuz Kharmatu, Tel Afer, which is their biggest territory, and Amirli, a city between Kirkuk and Baghdad. Most affected Turkmen tribes had no choice but to flee from IS advances. Shiite Turkmen were subject to the worst massacres, but Sunni tribes have also fallen prey to IS. One Sunni Turkmen leader allegedly killed his two daughters with poison upon IS’ approach. The only group strong enough to put up a fight have been the Abbasiyun, the largest of Tel Afer’s Sunni Turkmen tribes.
Yet the sectarian division in Iraq’s Turkmen tribes has become undeniable. Sunni Turkmen, who make up roughly half of its community in Iraq, were a double minority during Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-majority rule. When IS called for Sunni tribes to rise up against Baghdad, some of them answered. Sources suggest that a number of Turkmen are now in high-ranking positions in IS. The group might also be taking advantage of its Turkmen members for its contacts with Turkey. When IS attacked the Turkish consulate in Mosul and took 46 citizens hostage, it was the jihadist group’s Turkmen members who communicated with the captives, according to some accounts.
But the ITF remains devoted to its founding principle of including both sects among its members. Ersad Salihi, the ITF’s leader, pointed out in a talk in Ankara that three of its candidates for Mosul’s elections were Sunnis and have been kidnapped by IS. The ITF, he says, has been the jihadist group’s main target in Mosul, despite the entirely Sunni makeup in the city.
Turkmen: Kurdish Relations in Iraq
One important dynamic for Iraqi Turkmen’s future is their relationship with the Kurds. Nominally, the two communities are allies. The Turkmen occupy a handful of seats in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, and Turkmen forces have fought alongside the Peshmerga — Kurdish armed forces — against IS. Under the surface, however, things are more complicated.
The Turkmen do not receive the protection Christian minorities get, nor do they have the institutional makeup to defend themselves the way the Kurds have. They are alone on the frontlines of the IS onslaught and their numbers are thinning by the day.
The Kurds have held up better against the IS onslaught than the Iraqi army, giving them more sway in the country’s future. When the army fled the city fearing an IS attack, Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), ordered his forces to seize control of Kirkuk, which Kurds see as their historical capital. For Turkmen, this was a serious encroachment on their presence.
Kurdish and Turkmen territories overlap across several critical territories. Turkmen leaders like to point out that half a century ago, most of Erbil’s population was Turkmen. More importantly, however, the Turkmen were the majority in Kirkuk’s center before 2003. After the Saddam regime was toppled, Peshmerga troops stormed into the city’s downtown area and vandalized many Turkmen and Arab properties. They also had the foresight to burn land deeds from Kirkuk’s Land Registry Office, to prevent Turkmen from taking back their property in future lawsuits. The Turkmen who remained in Kirkuk have been struggling to hold onto their place ever since. Now that the city is entirely in Kurdish hands, the Turkmen fear they will be forced out entirely.
Yet Salihi has not abandoned hope of Turkmen-Kurdish cooperation. He wants to negotiate with the Kurdish leadership to lend Kirkuk a special status that would allow it to flourish as a pluralistic city after the war. “We shared the suffering and prison of the Saddam years with our Kurdish brothers,” he said at a meeting in Ankara, “but we wish that we had been included in the political process after 2003, just like they were.”
Part of the Turkmen’s dire situation is due to the lack of foreign aid. The US and Europe have been timid about arming rebel groups, much less identifying the Turkmen specifically as a community in need of protection.
In August, when IS laid siege to Amirli in Iraq, the only aid the Shiite Turkmen town had for nearly two months was a helicopter that carried supplies in from Baghdad twice a week. For months, the only foreign power to help them during the siege was Iran, sending its famous Gen. Kassim Suleimani to the Shiite Turkmen’s aid. Only in September did US drones provide enough air cover for the population to be evacuated. That stands in stark contrast to the sensitivity Western countries have showed for Christian and Yazidi minorities.
At least part of this is due to the assumption that Turkey stands as a natural ally to the Turkmen and will provide any aid necessary. However, that has not entirely been the case. Ankara does have good relations with the Turkmen, donning out generous educational scholarships in the past and, more recently, humanitarian assistance.
But the big brother to the north has proved timid when it comes to war. Syrian Turkmen lament that Turkey has provided little beyond a trickle of light weaponry — none more, according to Turkmen leaders, than it gave to Sunni Arab groups. “If we had received the weapons we desperately asked Turkey for,” a Turkmen commander said, “the majority-Turkmen areas would have been free of the ISIS [IS] threat.” The president of the Syria Turkmen Council, Abdurrahman Mustafa, said: “As ISIS [IS] parades around with the scud missiles and tanks it got from its Raqqa raid, we have to worry about how to save ammunition for our rifles.”
The matter has become a sore point with Turkey’s AK Party government. The Nationalist People’s Party (MHP), the country’s second-largest opposition party, has repeatedly called on the government to increase its aid to the Turkmen. Ahmet Davutoglu, then-foreign minister and the current prime minister, periodically assures them that his government has been helping the Turkmen as much as possible. Yet the MHP does not seem convinced. This summer, parliamentarians got into a fistfight when Sinan Ogan of the MHP gave a fiery speech condemning the government’s inaction. More recently, leftists such as the Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition People’s Republican Party (CHP), have also accused the AK Party of neglecting the Turkmen.
That leaves the Turkmen in a precarious position. The Turkmen do not receive the protection Christian minorities get, nor do they have the institutional makeup to defend themselves the way the Kurds have. They are alone on the frontlines of the IS onslaught and their numbers are thinning by the day.
If that continues, it will significantly impoverish the region. The Turkmen have much to offer by helping to rebuild Syria and Iraq — whatever shape those territories will take. Economically, they are a natural link to the commercial centers across the border in Turkey. More importantly, the Turkmen are moderates with a tradition of local, representative government. That is why anyone with a stake in the region’s stability should be concerned about the Turkmen’s predicament between Arab sectarianism and Kurdish nationalism today.
Huseyin Rasit Yilmaz is a Turkish analyst on ethnic conflict, terrorism and nationalism. He has been a researcher at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) since January 2011 and is a graduate student of politics and social sciences at Gazi University. Yilmaz has authored three books: “Being a Turk in Turkey ,” “Breaking Points of Turkish History” and “The Turks and Kurds/The Project of a Social Rehabilitation”
Selim Koru is an Ankara-based researcher on energy markets and foreign policy. He has worked and interned with various media institutions such as the Turkish daily Sabah, Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English offices in the US, and The Hill newspaper in Washington DC. He is currently a researcher at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). He holds a Bachelor’s in History from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and a Master’s in International Relations and Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
September 25, 2014 at 10:16 am | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
Tags: Arming the Turkmens, Ershad Salihi
Iraqi Turkmen leader calls for support
Arshad al-Salihi called for a safe zone to support the threatened minority.
World Bulletin / News Desk
Iraqi Turkmen Front President Arshad al-Salihi has said Western countries should provide weapons to Turkmen in Iraq.
Speaking at a meeting of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) in Ankara on Wednesday, where latest developments in Iraq and those facing Turkmen were discussed, al-Salihi said: “The West should also support us Turkmen with weapons, we are in need.”
Salihi said that the Turkmens’ lives and territory were in danger and stated that a “safe zone” should be provided for the threatened minority.
“All Turkmen, Shia or Sunni, have been exposed to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant militants’ attacks,” he said.
He also stated that Turkmen had seen the most casualties during ISIL militants’ attacks on the northern Iraqi province of Mosul.
Al-Salihi said: “Three of our deputies are still in the hands of ISIL, who call us every day saying they will cut their heads off.”
“Turkmen are the biggest target and we are being ignored.”
Referring to the militants’ attacks on Tal Afar since June, he said: “About 300,000 Turkmen have been forced to migrate to different regions, mainly to the south of Iraq and most of them will probably not be able to return.”
He added Turkmen had not received any humanitarian aid, unlike other minorities such as Christian, Yazidi and Kurds.
The president said: “Humanitarian supplies came only from Turkey.”
“We distributed all the supplies from the Turkish Red Crescent to everyone – not looking at whether they were Turkmen, Yazidi or Kurd – but today we need equal help from the West.”
According to al-Salihi, Iraq’s new government has also ignored Turkmen.
Last week, Nahla Sallamah, a Turkmen MP in the Iraqi parliament, said more than 350,000 Turkmen asylum seekers were in danger of starvation because the government had failed to financially support them.
The chaos created by ISIL militants has displaced more than one million Iraqis from their homes.
The group has mainly targeted Shia Muslims, Turkmens, Yazidis and Christians.
The Iraqi army failed to halt a sudden offensive by ISIL in June, which led to the group taking control of large swathes of land in the country, including the province of Mosul in the north.
September 20, 2014 at 12:11 am | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
Tags: Report BELADI CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH, Report on situation of Turkmen IDPs, Turkmen IDPs
REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF DISPLACED TURKMEN FAMILIES IN IRAQ AFTER THE EVENTS OF MOSUL
THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
BELADI CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF DISPLACED TURKMEN FAMILIES
AFTER THE EVENTS OF MOSUL
LIVING CONDITIONS OF TURKMEN FAMILIES
IN ARABIC https://docs.google.com/file/d/0Bw0JXzUnszw8XzdlN2xPSmJzU0k/edit
September 5, 2014 at 2:38 pm | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
Tags: Arthur Quesnay, EU Research Council, Maps Iraq-Syria, WAFAW
SECTARIAN STRATEGIES, NATIONAL SETTINGS AND THE WAR ECONOMY IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
Posted by Noria on juillet 16th, 2014
Adam BACZKO, Robin BEAUMONT, Arthur QUESNAY
Maps by Xavier HOUDOY
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These maps were designed by Xavier Houdoy for Noria, with the support of the European Research Council-funded program WAFAW. They were based on data gathered by Adam Baczko, Robin Beaumont, Felix Legrand and Arthur Quesnay in Syria and Iraq during field trips of various length spanning from Summer 2013 to June 2014.
The meaning of the various dynamics at work in today’s Iraq and Syria lies in their interactions. This poses a twofold challenge to the cartographers: on the one hand, to represent complex processes; on the other hand, to consider the perceptions and interpretations of the readers during the conceptualisation stage. Thus, not only for the sake of clarity, but also as a matter of cautiousness regarding the use that could be made of this work, we have chosen to use a triptych, with one title and one general legend for our three maps, which we consider impossible to apprehend separately.
While maps are the most adequate tool for the representation of various situations and dynamics, such as strategies for the acquisition of territorial control, their limits also appear quite easily. How can we capture the very pragmatic and punctual nature of certain alliances that imply fluctuating intensity and scope in terms of time and space? How should we differentiate between their symbolic and political importance and their territorial weight? Is it even conceivable to show a “Shia axis” when, despite its undeniable relevance in some areas, it remains a cumbersome cliché, which largely denies fundamental nuances? Last but not least, how best to show the weakening of a State other than in terms of territorial losses?
As already pointed out by Bénédicte Tratnjek regarding an older piece on Syria, working on ongoing conflicts, where the situation evolves on a daily basis, means working without anything like perfectly consistent and comprehensive data, even though those were collected and cross-checked, as is the case here, by researchers on the field. In that sense, these maps aim at allowing local, national, and regional dynamics to appear without exaggerating the differences between the various groups, neither to homogenize them.
Any use of those maps without specific permission of Noria is strictly prohibited. Please contact firstname.lastname@example.org for further information.
Regional alliances and transnational actors…
… local and national settings…
… and the war economy.
This article intends only, in line with its short length, to offer areas of reflection and avenues for further exploration.
In order to understand the current conflictual situation in Syria and Iraq it is important to take three aspects into consideration: trans-national sectarianism, pragmatic alliances and state resilience.
In a context of weakening State power, Syrian and Iraqi regimes have actively used sectarianism, in conjunction with an unprecedented level of violence, as the response. This has in turn led to popular discontent and as a consequence sectarian, transnational conflict throughout the region. The internationalization process follows two trends: on the one hand, a process with States as the main actors; on the other hand, a process pertaining to the infra-state level, revolving around ethnic (between the Kurds), but most of all sectarian solidarities (namely between Sunnis and Shiites).
Nevertheless, these new dynamics co-exist within traditional dynamics of tension and civil war. Whether local economic partnerships or pragmatic alliances, such as between ISIL and the Syrian regime, they show that sectarianism and the conflict’s regionalization remain direct consequences of the regimes’ strategies.
Despite ISIL’s ability to remain a dominant player in the region and the threat posed by them, the States are likely to remain powerful players and the main organising system for the people in the region – the “Shia axis” being not much more than a collection of States. The future of the conflict therefore depends largely on the people.
Political stakeholders redefining identity
The civil war in Syria and the increasing violence in Iraq are the expression of revolutionary situations which should be seen as part of a continuation of the « Arab Spring. »
The quick and brutal political reconfigurations have been accompanied by a process of religious sectarianism; the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, now renamed the Islamic State (IS)) and the accompanying assault on Baghdad are some of the most recent manifestations.
This alignment of stakeholders along a Shi’ite-Sunni opposition line is the consequence of three interrelated elements. Firstly, the instrumentalisation of religious identities by the regimes of Nouri al-Maliki and Bashar al-Asad in order for them to remain in power. Secondly, religious recruitment organized by “identity entrepreneurs”; and lastly, with the weakening of the State, vulnerable societies in an increasingly violent environment, who are left with limited alternative routes.
However important the rise of this religious dimension might be, it is also accompanied by a set of interdependent factors, the analysis of which is essential to an understanding of this crisis: social transformations, political demands, exacerbations of identity differences and opportunism, in particular economic opportunism.
The current crisis might indeed suggest the rise of a transnational Sunni Arab axis that straddles Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, but the people of these three countries have very different historical trajectories. Even if the Syrian revolution was carried by a Sunni majority that had long been marginalised by a regime identified as Alawi, it was the result of multi-faith protest against authoritarian rule.In Iraq, the insurgency is the result of a Sunni minority marginalized by a new Shi’ite political elite following the 2003 U.S. invasion. The Sunni insurgencies in Iraq and Syria are therefore examples of two very different national configurations. In addition, the sponsorship of certain Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in particular, whilst presented as part of a religious solidarity are in fact above all the strategies of regional powers that seek to overthrow the Syrian and Iraqi allies against their Iranian competitor.
Similarly, the « Shia axis » is above all a political alliance between Iran, the Iraqi regime, some Iraqi Shi’ite groups, the Syrian regime and Hizbullah. Theologically, TwelverShi’ism and the Alawite religion have little in common, and the Shi’ite character of the alliance is primarily an external perception. Shi’ism gains a transnational dimension where it is instrumentalised by regimes in order to create popular militias and support, for example by calling for the defense of Shi’ite shrines in Samarra in Iraq and SayyidaZaynab in Syria. Beyond the very real ideological commitment of the militias, their continuation beyond their national boundaries depends above all on the logistical capacities of the military organizations to which they belong, and ultimately the resources provided by the States that sponsor them.
By over simplifying sectarian identities, a particularly malleable notion, religious division, in the context of civil war, is exacerbated. Different theological branches of Shi’ism in the region, from Alawism to Zaydism, with considerably different historical evolutions from the Twelver doctrine, are thus easily confused together within the context of civil war. The mediatisation of violence is a particularly effective weapon of differentiation for stakeholders such as the Islamic State and the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, whose strategy is based on increasing the denominational dimension of each of the opposing sides. The distribution in June 2014 by ISIL of images of hundreds of Shi’ites being executed, retouched to make them even more shocking can be analysed in the wake of the massacre carried out in Alawite villages in the province of Latakia in August 2013. The bombing in 2011 of Sunni neighborhoods by the Syrian regime had a similar objective. The political strategies put in place by the protagonists are what primarily creates identity opposition lines within the populations, and their implementation is possible only if they have access to the necessary resources.
Transversal logic and local alliances
Beyond the religious conflicts that run deeply through the crisis, the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars are each different, depending on temporary alliances and the various social, economic and political interests. The loss of Mosul by the Iraqi regime took place after many years of a gradual loss of control of the city by the Iraqi army. Radicalized social movements, a result of the repression of Baghdad, made the advance negotiations between ISIL, Baathist insurgents and local Islamists, possible. In the Syrian Jezireh, local alliances depend largely on historical factors that existed prior to the crisis. In Rabia, at the Iraqi-Syrian border, the PKK was joined in 2014 by local Arab fighters, to fight ISIL. These local fighters were from long-established tribes in the region. However, when the armed Kurdish group advanced to the border crossing Tall Amis, a hundred kilometres south, the local Arab population, descendants from settlers of the Baathist regime against the Kurds, joined ISIL in its stand off against the PKK. In Kirkuk, the presence of Shi’ite Turkmens militiamen is possible only as a result of the intented strategy of the Iraqi Kurds to weaken the central government, hence forcing those militias to work with them. In Syria and Iraq, the rise of Shi’ite militias depends on the collaborative relationship between armed groups, the regime and local populations.
The Syrian regime plays a key role in the economy of transnational war that is taking place in the Middle East. To resist the opposition, Bashar al-Asad delegated control of the Kurdish areas to the PKK from July 2012 and allowed ISIL to prosper whilst avoiding bombarding its positions.
The Syrian regime additionally bought crude oil for its refineries from the PKK and ISIL and sold the refined product back to ISIL, whilst refusing the same to the Syrian rebels. Damascus maintains an ambiguous relationship with the PKK and ISIL, who do not pose a direct threat; both groups can use Syria as a behind the lines base for their operations in Iraq and Turkey. It is only with ISIS’ offensive in Iraq and against Baghdad that the Syrian regime began their bombing, in order to appear to the outside world and the West as a key player in the fight against an entity whose strength it had significantly bolstered.
On the side of the Kurds, they are exploiting a historic opportunity with the weakening of the States to negotiate economic and political benefits from Baghdad, Damascus, and Ankara. Indeed, any political or military reconquest of Iraqi Sunni areas would require the support of KRG. The KRG is today in a strong position in its discussions on the positions open in government, the status of territories conquered since June 10 (the town of Kirkuk, and the northern provinces of Nineveh and Diyala) and the right to export directly to Turkey its oil. Similarly in Syria, the PKK is now in possession of territories in Afrin, Qobane and in the Jezireh to recruit and train men, in coordination with its Iraqi sanctuaries in the Qandil and Zab mountains.
The Resilience of a National Logic
If the weakening of states has made the borders porous, the challenge to these borders, regularly announced, will likely remain unsuccessful.
Whilst the regimes and national balance is up-ended, the states themselves are not. National borders remain part of the framework of the demands of the majority of armed groups who define themselves primarily as nationalists and whose operations depend on local dynamics of mobilization. National insurgent movements in Syria since 2011 – now the Army of the Mujahideen (Jayshal-Mujahideen), the Syrian Revolutionary Front (Jabhatal-Thuâral-Sûrîyîn) and the Syrian Islamic Front (al-Jabha al-Islâmîyya al-sûrrîyya) – and in Iraq since 2004 – the Naqshbandi brotherhood (Jama’at al-Naqshbandîyya), the Companions of Islam (Ansar al-Islam), the Army of the Mujahideen (Jaysh al-Mujahideen) – are all fighting for national goals. In their current alliance with ISIL, they continue to follow their own agenda against the Syrian and Iraqi regimes, in direct opposition to those, transnational and religious, of the Islamic State. These movements are composed of nationals, with a nationalistic vision that aims to conquer Baghdad or Damascus.
Similarly, the involvement of Hizbullah alongside the Syrian regime and the influx of more than one million Syrian Sunnis into Lebanon has profoundly destabilised the country. If political relations are increasingly strained between the protagonists, with clashes multiplying – in Tripoli in particular – the fact that the country has not entered into the civil war confirms the salience of a largely national framework.
Paradoxically, the transnational configuration of the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts has underlined the differences between the two countries. The crisis is regionalized in terms of the number of countries involved, the importance of cross-border military and economic movements, but these resources all primarily support groups with national objectives. With the exception of the PKK and IS, all protagonists perceive the conquest of territory, or at least a redistribution of power, as the only solution. They do not imagine the creation of a new state with redrawn borders as a long-term solution but as a considerable territorial loss. This is even more the case since the areas that have a mixed population are still significant, especially in the cities, and do not allow for a redefined, clear division of the territory.
Even the Islamic State, despite its desire to create a genuine caliphate, has been forced to take into account the differences of each national situation, and to follow different strategies regarding the two countries. In Iraq, the movement aims to take Baghdad and overthrow the regime, while in Syria it does not attack the regime but maintains its grip on a territory which resources it uses. As such, in Syria IS controls the population directly and confronts the insurrection with whom it is competing for control of the territory. In Iraq, it joins forces with the insurgency whom it leaves to control the territory, in order to focus its efforts on the front against the Iraqi regime.
Religious division as a mode of government as used by Maliki and Asad, and as a strategy of sectarian identities for the Islamic State, reduces the potential for a compromise between national Sunni movements and the regimes in power.
In addition, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar feed this line of division in their own struggle for regional leadership. Finally, the West has now politically disengaged, investing primarily on humanitarian issues and terrorism. This is the first crisis in the Middle East where Western countries do not play a decisive role in the course of events. Traumatized by the war in Iraq, caught in a difficult withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States now commits only limited resources and leaves the local protagonists and regimes free to follow their own strategy. And in this way, nothing prevents the rise of religious players who in the expression of their local, predatory logic, guarantee the continuation of civil war.
Translation by Louise ROSEN
September 5, 2014 at 6:31 am | Posted in Turkmens | Leave a comment
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Tags: Barbara Nimri Aziz, Turkmens
Who, What and Where are Iraq’s Turkmen?
by BARBARA NIMRI AZIZ
Know your Yazidi. An anthropological sketch will assure support for US and Peshmarga military advances across Iraq, and sequester a competing other minority—Iraq’s Turkmen.
International concern in Iraq pivots around saving the Yazidi people. Christians seem to count too; the Shabak also merit some attention. One can only applaud humanitarian support for any threatened population. But why the total dismissal of their neighbors and fellow Iraqis, the Turkmen? They too are at grave risk. Augmenting Al-Mufti’s account from the ground is a report noting how, “While the European Parliament … officially acknowledges the situation faced by minorities in ISIS occupied Iraq, their resolution … [2014/2716(RSP)] made no specific mention of Iraqi Turkmen… among the worst affected”.
Yes, Iraqi Turkmen are among millions now terrorized by the insufferable ISIS. Turkmen’s expulsion is not new however. A review of their history over the past decade reveals a pattern of forced removal from cities and villages across north Iraq. Not by ISIS, by American allies: Iraqi Kurds.
Telafar, a majority Turkmen city of 200,000 was all but depopulated beginning in 2003 when Kurdish Peshmarga reportedly conducted massacres there; attacks targeting Turkmen continued thereafter. This coincided with a political campaign to absorb ancient Kirkuk City along with Ninevah and Diyala provinces by Kurdish authorities. In 2009 the parliament of Kurdistan voted on a constitution to claim these areas, extending Kurdish rule beyond Suleimaniya, Dohok and Irbil. Mass Kurdish migration into Turkmen homelands displaced Turkmen, creating new facts-on-the-ground. In 2011 the Peshmarga Kurdish militia occupied Kirkuk, ostensibly to protect local inhabitants.The Turkmen National Front has been struggling with little success to push back Kurdish takeovers. They’ve no militia of their own and support from Baghdad, always weak, has now collapsed.
International news and human rights agencies consistently disregarded Kurdish advances into Turkmen areas. Today too. Turkmen are being whited-out of the picture. Why? It appears to be part of a strategy to consolidate Kurdish claims over all the Turkmen homelands.
Kurds took command of Kirkuk a month ago, again “to save” the city, this time from ISIS. The Peshmarga militia is a major US ally; resupplied with heavy weapons, it’s now engaged with the US military to push ISIS out of Mosel.
We may find Kurdistan awarded full control over Ninevah and Diyala– provinces they have long coveted. Its illegitimate constitutional claim becomes a reality.
One does not seek to tarnish one people at the expense of another. But the current situation in northern Iraq suggests it’s more than a heroic drive to protect endangered civilians. Here is an opportunity to answer Kurdish territorial and political ambitions.
Iraq’s Turkmen are ancient inhabitants of Iraq. Estimates of their numbers vary from 1-3 million: possibly 13% of the population, Iraq’s third main ethnic group. Turkmen are well known as loyal Iraqi nationals, Shiia and Sunni. They speak Turkish and Arabic. They’ve used just means to hold onto their rights and their homeland. And they deserve to be heard and embraced. Even as observers, let’s not be manipulated by the divide-and-rule policies of others which have done so much harm across this land.
Barbara Nimri Aziz is a veteran anthropologist and journalist. Her latest book is Swimming up the Tigris: Real Life Encounters in Iraq (2007).